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CMS_verify(3)                       OpenSSL                      CMS_verify(3)

       CMS_verify, CMS_get0_signers - verify a CMS SignedData structure

       libcrypto, -lcrypto

        #include <openssl/cms.h>

        int CMS_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store,
                       BIO *indata, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);

        STACK_OF(X509) *CMS_get0_signers(CMS_ContentInfo *cms);

       CMS_verify() verifies a CMS SignedData structure. cms is the
       CMS_ContentInfo structure to verify. certs is a set of certificates in
       which to search for the signing certificate(s). store is a trusted
       certificate store used for chain verification. indata is the detached
       content if the content is not present in cms. The content is written to
       out if it is not NULL.

       flags is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the
       verify operation.

       CMS_get0_signers() retrieves the signing certificate(s) from cms, it
       may only be called after a successful CMS_verify() operation.

       Normally the verify process proceeds as follows.

       Initially some sanity checks are performed on cms. The type of cms must
       be SignedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if
       the content is detached indata cannot be NULL.

       An attempt is made to locate all the signing certificate(s), first
       looking in the certs parameter (if it is not NULL) and then looking in
       any certificates contained in the cms structure itself. If any signing
       certificate cannot be located the operation fails.

       Each signing certificate is chain verified using the smimesign purpose
       and the supplied trusted certificate store. Any internal certificates
       in the message are used as untrusted CAs. If CRL checking is enabled in
       store any internal CRLs are used in addition to attempting to look them
       up in store. If any chain verify fails an error code is returned.

       Finally the signed content is read (and written to out if it is not
       NULL) and the signature's checked.

       If all signature's verify correctly then the function is successful.

       Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the flags
       parameter to change the default verify behaviour.

       If CMS_NOINTERN is set the certificates in the message itself are not
       searched when locating the signing certificate(s). This means that all
       the signing certificates must be in the certs parameter.

       If CMS_NOCRL is set and CRL checking is enabled in store then any CRLs
       in the message itself are ignored.

       If the CMS_TEXT flag is set MIME headers for type text/plain are
       deleted from the content. If the content is not of type text/plain then
       an error is returned.

       If CMS_NO_SIGNER_CERT_VERIFY is set the signing certificates are not

       If CMS_NO_ATTR_VERIFY is set the signed attributes signature is not

       If CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY is set then the content digest is not checked.

       One application of CMS_NOINTERN is to only accept messages signed by a
       small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be
       passed in the certs parameter. In this case if the signer is not one of
       the certificates supplied in certs then the verify will fail because
       the signer cannot be found.

       In some cases the standard techniques for looking up and validating
       certificates are not appropriate: for example an application may wish
       to lookup certificates in a database or perform customised
       verification. This can be achieved by setting and verifying the signers
       certificates manually using the signed data utility functions.

       Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for
       example setting CMS_NO_CONTENT_VERIFY will totally disable all content
       verification and any modified content will be considered valid. This
       combination is however useful if one merely wishes to write the content
       to out and its validity is not considered important.

       Chain verification should arguably be performed using the signing time
       rather than the current time. However, since the signing time is
       supplied by the signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence
       (such as a trusted timestamp).

       CMS_verify() returns 1 for a successful verification and zero if an
       error occurred.

       CMS_get0_signers() returns all signers or NULL if an error occurred.

       The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3)

       The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signing
       certificate, this is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current
       X509_STORE functionality.

       The lack of single pass processing means that the signed content must
       all be held in memory if it is not detached.

       ERR_get_error(3), CMS_sign(3)

       Copyright 2008-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
       this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
       in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at

1.1.1i                            2020-12-10                     CMS_verify(3)