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DTLSv1_listen(3)                    OpenSSL                   DTLSv1_listen(3)



NAME
       SSL_stateless, DTLSv1_listen - Statelessly listen for incoming
       connections

LIBRARY
       libcrypto, -lcrypto

SYNOPSIS
        #include <openssl/ssl.h>

        int SSL_stateless(SSL *s);
        int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *ssl, BIO_ADDR *peer);

DESCRIPTION
       SSL_stateless() statelessly listens for new incoming TLSv1.3
       connections.  DTLSv1_listen() statelessly listens for new incoming DTLS
       connections. If a ClientHello is received that does not contain a
       cookie, then they respond with a request for a new ClientHello that
       does contain a cookie. If a ClientHello is received with a cookie that
       is verified then the function returns in order to enable the handshake
       to be completed (for example by using SSL_accept()).

NOTES
       Some transport protocols (such as UDP) can be susceptible to
       amplification attacks. Unlike TCP there is no initial connection setup
       in UDP that validates that the client can actually receive messages on
       its advertised source address. An attacker could forge its source IP
       address and then send handshake initiation messages to the server. The
       server would then send its response to the forged source IP. If the
       response messages are larger than the original message then the
       amplification attack has succeeded.

       If DTLS is used over UDP (or any datagram based protocol that does not
       validate the source IP) then it is susceptible to this type of attack.
       TLSv1.3 is designed to operate over a stream-based transport protocol
       (such as TCP).  If TCP is being used then there is no need to use
       SSL_stateless(). However some stream-based transport protocols (e.g.
       QUIC) may not validate the source address. In this case a TLSv1.3
       application would be susceptible to this attack.

       As a countermeasure to this issue TLSv1.3 and DTLS include a stateless
       cookie mechanism. The idea is that when a client attempts to connect to
       a server it sends a ClientHello message. The server responds with a
       HelloRetryRequest (in TLSv1.3) or a HelloVerifyRequest (in DTLS) which
       contains a unique cookie. The client then resends the ClientHello, but
       this time includes the cookie in the message thus proving that the
       client is capable of receiving messages sent to that address. All of
       this can be done by the server without allocating any state, and thus
       without consuming expensive resources.

       OpenSSL implements this capability via the SSL_stateless() and
       DTLSv1_listen() functions. The ssl parameter should be a newly
       allocated SSL object with its read and write BIOs set, in the same way
       as might be done for a call to SSL_accept(). Typically, for DTLS, the
       read BIO will be in an "unconnected" state and thus capable of
       receiving messages from any peer.

       When a ClientHello is received that contains a cookie that has been
       verified, then these functions will return with the ssl parameter
       updated into a state where the handshake can be continued by a call to
       (for example) SSL_accept().  Additionally, for DTLSv1_listen(), the
       BIO_ADDR pointed to by peer will be filled in with details of the peer
       that sent the ClientHello. If the underlying BIO is unable to obtain
       the BIO_ADDR of the peer (for example because the BIO does not support
       this), then *peer will be cleared and the family set to AF_UNSPEC.
       Typically user code is expected to "connect" the underlying socket to
       the peer and continue the handshake in a connected state.

       Prior to calling DTLSv1_listen() user code must ensure that cookie
       generation and verification callbacks have been set up using
       SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb() and SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb()
       respectively. For SSL_stateless(),
       SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb() and
       SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_verify_cb() must be used instead.

       Since DTLSv1_listen() operates entirely statelessly whilst processing
       incoming ClientHellos it is unable to process fragmented messages
       (since this would require the allocation of state). An implication of
       this is that DTLSv1_listen() only supports ClientHellos that fit inside
       a single datagram.

       For SSL_stateless() if an entire ClientHello message cannot be read
       without the "read" BIO becoming empty then the SSL_stateless() call
       will fail. It is the application's responsibility to ensure that data
       read from the "read" BIO during a single SSL_stateless() call is all
       from the same peer.

       SSL_stateless() will fail (with a 0 return value) if some TLS version
       less than TLSv1.3 is used.

       Both SSL_stateless() and DTLSv1_listen() will clear the error queue
       when they start.

RETURN VALUES
       For SSL_stateless() a return value of 1 indicates success and the ssl
       object will be set up ready to continue the handshake. A return value
       of 0 or -1 indicates failure. If the value is 0 then a
       HelloRetryRequest was sent. A value of -1 indicates any other error.
       User code may retry the SSL_stateless() call.

       For DTLSv1_listen() a return value of >= 1 indicates success. The ssl
       object will be set up ready to continue the handshake.  the peer value
       will also be filled in.

       A return value of 0 indicates a non-fatal error. This could (for
       example) be because of non-blocking IO, or some invalid message having
       been received from a peer. Errors may be placed on the OpenSSL error
       queue with further information if appropriate. Typically user code is
       expected to retry the call to DTLSv1_listen() in the event of a non-
       fatal error.

       A return value of <0 indicates a fatal error. This could (for example)
       be because of a failure to allocate sufficient memory for the
       operation.

       For DTLSv1_listen(), prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0, fatal and non-fatal errors
       both produce return codes <= 0 (in typical implementations user code
       treats all errors as non-fatal), whilst return codes >0 indicate
       success.

SEE ALSO
       SSL_get_error(3), SSL_accept(3), ssl(7), bio(7)

HISTORY
       SSL_stateless() was first added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.

       DTLSv1_listen() return codes were clarified in OpenSSL 1.1.0. The type
       of "peer" also changed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.

COPYRIGHT
       Copyright 2015-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
       this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
       in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
       <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.



1.1.1                             2018-09-17                  DTLSv1_listen(3)