Updated: 2022/Sep/29

Please read Privacy Policy. It's for your privacy.

RSA_public_encrypt(3) OpenSSL RSA_public_encrypt(3)NAMERSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt - RSA public key cryptographyLIBRARYlibcrypto, -lcryptoSYNOPSIS#include <openssl/rsa.h> int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);DESCRIPTIONRSA_public_encrypt()encrypts theflenbytes atfrom(usually a session key) using the public keyrsaand stores the ciphertext into.tomust point to RSA_size(rsa) bytes of memory.paddingdenotes one of the following modes: RSA_PKCS1_PADDING PKCS #1 v1.5 padding. This currently is the most widely used mode. However, it is highly recommended to use RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING in new applications. SEE WARNING BELOW. RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications. RSA_SSLV23_PADDING PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes that the server is SSL3 capable. RSA_NO_PADDING Raw RSA encryption. This mode should only be used to implement cryptographically sound padding modes in the application code. Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.flenmust not be more than RSA_size(rsa) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(rsa) - 42 for RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(rsa) for RSA_NO_PADDING. When a padding mode other than RSA_NO_PADDING is in use, thenRSA_public_encrypt()will include some random bytes into the ciphertext and therefore the ciphertext will be different each time, even if the plaintext and the public key are exactly identical. The returned ciphertext intowill always be zero padded to exactly RSA_size(rsa) bytes.toandfrommay overlap.RSA_private_decrypt()decrypts theflenbytes atfromusing the private keyrsaand stores the plaintext into.flenshould be equal to RSA_size(rsa) but may be smaller, when leading zero bytes are in the ciphertext. Those are not important and may be removed, butRSA_public_encrypt()does not do that.tomust point to a memory section large enough to hold the maximal possible decrypted data (which is equal to RSA_size(rsa) for RSA_NO_PADDING, RSA_size(rsa) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes and RSA_size(rsa) - 42 for RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING).paddingis the padding mode that was used to encrypt the data.toandfrommay overlap.RETURNVALUESRSA_public_encrypt()returns the size of the encrypted data (i.e., RSA_size(rsa)).RSA_private_decrypt()returns the size of the recovered plaintext. A return value of 0 is not an error and means only that the plaintext was empty. On error, -1 is returned; the error codes can be obtained byERR_get_error(3).WARNINGSDecryption failures in the RSA_PKCS1_PADDING mode leak information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.CONFORMINGTOSSL, PKCS #1 v2.0SEE ALSOERR_get_error(3),RAND_bytes(3),RSA_size(3)COPYRIGHTCopyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>. 1.1.1i 2020-01-23 RSA_public_encrypt(3)